By Hans-Hermann Hoppe
The classical argument in favor of free immigration runs
as follows: Other things being equal, businesses go to low-wage areas,
and labor moves to high-wage areas, thus affecting a tendency toward the
equalization of wage rates (for the same kind of labor) as well as the
optimal localization of capital. An influx of migrants into a
given-sized high-wage area will lower nominal wage rates. However, it
will not lower real wage rates if the population is below its optimum
size. To the contrary, if this is the case, the produced output will
increase over-proportionally, and real incomes will actually rise. Thus,
restrictions on immigration will harm the protected domestic workers
qua consumers more than they gain qua producers. Moreover, immigration
restrictions will increase the “flight” of capital abroad (the export of
capital which otherwise might have stayed), still causing an
equalization of wage rates (although somewhat more slowly), but leading
to a less than optimal allocation of capital, thereby harming world
living standards all-around.
In addition, traditionally labor unions, and nowadays
environmentalists, are opposed to free immigration, and this should
prima facie count as another argument in favor of a policy of free
immigration.
II
As it is stated, the above argument in favor of free
immigration is irrefutable and correct. It would be foolish to attack
it, just as it would be foolish to deny that free trade leads to higher
living standards than does protectionism.
It would also be wrongheaded to attack the above case
for free immigration by pointing out that because of the existence of a
welfare state, immigration has become to a significant extent the
immigration of welfare-bums, who, even if the United States, for
instance, is below her optimal population point, do not increase but
rather decrease average living standards. For this is not an argument
against immigration but against the welfare state. To be sure, the
welfare state should be destroyed, root and branch. However, in any case
the problems of immigration and welfare are analytically distinct
problems, and they must be treated accordingly.
The problem with the above argument is that it suffers
from two interrelated shortcomings which invalidate its unconditional
pro-immigration conclusion and/or which render the argument applicable
only to a highly unrealistic – long bygone – situation in human history.
The first shortcoming will only be touched upon. To
libertarians of the Austrian school, it should be clear that what
constitutes “wealth” and “well-being” is subjective. Material wealth is
not the only thing that counts. Thus, even if real incomes rise due to
immigration, it does not follow that immigration must be considered
“good,” for one might prefer lower living standards and a greater
distance to other people over higher living standards and a smaller
distance to others.
Instead, a second, related shortcoming will be the focus
here. With regard to a given territory into which people immigrate, it
is left unanalyzed who, if anyone, owns (controls) this territory. In
fact, in order to render the above argument applicable, it is –
implicitly – assumed that the territory in question is unowned, and that
the immigrants enter virgin territory (open frontier). Obviously, this
can no longer be assumed. If this assumption is dropped, however, the
problem of immigration takes on an entirely new meaning and requires
fundamental rethinking.
III
For the purpose of illustration, let us first assume an
anarcho-capitalist society. Though convinced that such a society is the
only social order that can be defended as just, I do not want to explain
here why this is the case. Instead, I will employ it as a conceptual
benchmark, because this will help clear up the fundamental misconception
of most contemporary free immigration advocates.
All land is privately owned, including all streets,
rivers, airports, harbors, etc. With respect to some pieces of land, the
property title may be unrestricted; that is, the owner is permitted to
do with his property whatever he pleases as long as he does not
physically damage the property owned by others. With respect to other
territories, the property title may be more or less severely restricted.
As is currently the case in some housing developments, the owner may be
bound by contractual limitations on what he can do with his property
(voluntary zoning), which might include residential vs. commercial use,
no buildings more than four stories high, no sale or rent to Jews, Germans, Catholics, homosexuals, Haitians, families with or without children, or smokers, for example.
Clearly, under this scenario there exists no such thing
as freedom of immigration. Rather, there exists the freedom of many
independent private property owners to admit or exclude others from
their own property in accordance with their own unrestricted or
restricted property titles. Admission to some territories might be easy,
while to others it might be nearly impossible. In any case, however,
admission to the property of the admitting person does not imply a
“freedom to move around,” unless other property owners consent to such
movements. There will be as much immigration or non-immigration,
inclusivity or exclusivity, desegregation or segregation,
non-discrimination or discrimination based on racial, ethnic,
linguistic, religious, cultural or whatever other grounds as individual
owners or associations of individual owners allow.
Note that none of this, not even the most exclusive form
of segregationism, has anything to do with a rejection of free trade
and the adoption of protectionism. From the fact that one does not want
to associate with or live in the neighborhood of Blacks, Turks,
Catholics or Hindus, etc., it does not follow that one does not want to
trade with them from a distance. To the contrary, it is precisely the
absolute voluntariness of human association and separation – the absence
of any form of forced integration – that makes peaceful relationships –
free trade – between culturally, racially, ethnically, or religiously
distinct people possible.
IV
In an anarcho-capitalist society there is no government and,
accordingly, no clear-cut distinction between inlanders (domestic
citizens) and foreigners. This distinction comes into existence only
with the establishment of a government, i.e., an institution which
possesses a territorial monopoly of aggression (taxation). The territory
over which a government’s taxing power extends becomes “inland,” and
everyone residing outside of this territory becomes a foreigner. State
borders (and passports), are an “unnatural” (coercive) institution.
Indeed, their existence (and that of a domestic government) implies a
two-fold distortion with respect to peoples’ natural inclination to
associate with others. First, inlanders cannot exclude the government
(the taxman) from their own property, but are subject to what one might
call “forced integration” by government agents. Second, in order to be
able to intrude on its subjects’ private property so as to tax them, a
government must invariably take control of existing roads, and it will
employ its tax revenue to produce even more roads to gain even better
access to all private property, as a potential tax source. Thus, this
over-production of roads does not involve merely an innocent
facilitation of interregional trade – a lowering of transaction costs –
as starry-eyed economists would have us believe, but it involves forced
domestic integration (artificial desegregation of separate localities).
Moreover, with the establishment of a government and
state borders, immigration takes on an entirely new meaning. Immigration
becomes immigration by foreigners across state borders, and the
decision as to whether or not a person should be admitted no longer
rests with private property owners or associations of such owners but
with the government as the ultimate sovereign of all domestic residents
and the ultimate super-owner of all their properties. Now, if the
government excludes a person while even one domestic resident wants to
admit this very person onto his property, the result is forced exclusion
(a phenomenon that does not exist under private property anarchism).
Furthermore, if the government admits a person while there is not even
one domestic resident who wants to have this person on his property, the
result is forced integration (also non-existent under private property
anarchism).
V
It is now time to enrich the analysis through the
introduction of a few “realistic” empirical assumptions. Let us assume
that the government is privately owned. The ruler literally owns the
entire country within state borders. He owns part of the territory
outright (his property title is unrestricted), and he is partial owner
of the rest (as landlord or residual claimant of all of his
citizen-tenants real estate holdings, albeit restricted by some kind of
pre-existing rental contract). He can sell and bequeath his property,
and he can calculate and “realize” the monetary value of his capital
(his country).
Traditional monarchies – and kings – are the closest historical examples of this form of government.
What will a king’s typical immigration and emigration
policy be? Because he owns the entire country’s capital value, he will,
assuming no more than his self-interest, tend to choose migration
policies that preserve or enhance rather than diminish the value of his
kingdom.Traditional monarchies – and kings – are the closest historical
examples of this form of government.
As far as emigration is concerned, a king will want to
prevent the emigration of productive subjects, in particular of his best
and most productive subjects, because losing them would lower the value
of the kingdom. Thus, for example, from 1782 until 1824 a law
prohibited the emigration of skilled workmen from Britain. On the other
hand, a king will want to expel his non-productive and destructive
subjects (criminals, bums, beggars, gypsies, vagabonds, etc.), for their
removal from his territory would increase the value of his realm. For
this reason Britain expelled tens of thousands of common criminals to
North America and Australia.
On the other hand, as far as immigration policy is
concerned, a king would want to keep the mob, as well as all people of
inferior productive capabilities, out. People of the latter category
would only be admitted temporarily, if at all, as seasonal workers
without citizenship, and they would be barred from permanent property
ownership. Thus, for example, after 1880 large numbers of Poles were
hired as seasonal workers in Germany. A king would only permit the
permanent immigration of superior or at least above-average people;
i.e., those, whose residence in his kingdom would increase his own
property value. Thus, for example, after 1685 (with the revocation of
the Edict of Nantes) tens of thousands of Huguenots were permitted to
settle in Prussia; and similarly Peter the Great, Frederick the Great,
and Maria Theresia later promoted the immigration and settlement of
large numbers of Germans in Russia, Prussia, and the eastern provinces of Austria-Hungary.
In brief, while through his immigration policies a king
might not entirely avoid all cases of forced exclusion or forced
integration, such policies would by and large do the same as what
private property owners would do, if they could decide who to admit and
who to exclude. That is, the king would be highly selective and very
much concerned about improving the quality of the resident human capital
so as to drive property values up, not down.
VI
Migration policies become predictably different, once the government
is publicly owned. The ruler no longer owns the country’s capital value,
but only has current use of it. He cannot sell or bequeath his position
as ruler; he is merely a temporary caretaker. Moreover, “free entry”
into the position of a caretaker government exists. Anyone can, in
principle, become the ruler of the country.
Democracies as they came into existence on a world-wide
scale after World War I offer historical examples of public
government.Migration policies become predictably different, once the
government is publicly owned. The ruler no longer owns the country’s
capital value, but only has current use of it. He cannot sell or
bequeath his position as ruler; he is merely a temporary caretaker.
Moreover, “free entry” into the position of a caretaker government
exists. Anyone can, in principle, become the ruler of the country.
What are a democracy’s migration policies? Once again
assuming no more than self-interest (maximizing monetary and psychic
income: money and power), democratic rulers tend to maximize current
income, which they can appropriate privately, at the expense of capital
values, which they cannot appropriate privately. Hence, in accordance
with democracy’s inherent egalitarianism of one-man-one-vote, they tend
to pursue a distinctly egalitarian – non-discriminatory – emigration and
immigration policy.
As far as emigration policy is concerned, this implies
that for a democratic ruler it makes little, if any, difference whether
productive or unproductive people, geniuses or bums leave the country.
They have all one equal vote. In fact, democratic rulers might well be
more concerned about the loss of a bum than that of a productive genius.
While the loss of the latter would obviously lower the capital value of
the country and loss of the former might actually increase it, a
democratic ruler does not own the country. In the short run, which most
interests a democratic ruler, the bum, voting most likely in favor of
egalitarian measures, might be more valuable than the productive genius
who, as egalitarianism’s prime victim, will more likely vote against the
democratic ruler. For the same reason, a democratic ruler, quite unlike
a king, undertakes little to actively expel those people whose presence
within the country constitutes a negative externality (human trash,
which drives individual property values down). In fact, such negative
externalities – unproductive parasites, bums, and criminals – are likely
to be his most reliable supporters.
As far as immigration policies are concerned, the
incentives and disincentives are likewise distorted, and the results are
equally perverse. For a democratic ruler, it also matters little
whether bums or geniuses, below or above-average
civilized and productive people immigrate into the country. Nor is he
much concerned about the distinction between temporary workers (owners
of work permits) and permanent, property owning immigrants (naturalized
citizens). In fact, bums and unproductive people may well be preferable
as residents and citizens, because they cause more so-called “social”
problem,” and democratic rulers thrive on the existence of such
problems. Moreover, bums and inferior people will likely support his
egalitarian policies, whereas geniuses and superior people will not. The
result of this policy of non-discrimination is forced integration: the
forcing of masses of inferior immigrants onto domestic property owners
who, if they could have decided for themselves, would have sharply
discriminated and chosen very different neighbors for themselves. Thus,
the United States immigration laws of 1965, as the best available
example of democracy at work, eliminated all formerly existing “quality”
concerns and the explicit preference for European immigrants and
replaced it with a policy of almost complete non-discrimination
(multi-culturalism).
Indeed, though rarely noticed, the immigration policy of
a democracy is the mirror image of its policy toward internal
population movements: toward the voluntary association and dissociation,
segregation and desegregation, and the physical distancing and
approximating of various private property owners. Like a king, a
democratic ruler will promote spatial over-integration by over-producing
the “public good” of roads. However, for a democratic ruler, unlike a
king, it will not be sufficient that everyone can move next door to
anyone else on government roads. Concerned about his current income and
power rather than capital values and constrained by egalitarian
sentiments, a democratic ruler will tend to go even further. Through
non-discrimination laws – one cannot discriminate against Germans, Jews,
Blacks, Catholics, Hindus, homosexuals, etc. – the government will want
to open even the physical access and entrance to everyone’s property to
everyone else. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the so-called “Civil
Rights” legislation in the United States, which outlawed domestic
discrimination on the basis of color, race, national origin, religion,
gender, age, sexual orientation, disability, etc., and which thereby
actually mandated forced integration, coincided with the adoption of a
non-discriminatory immigration policy; i.e., mandated inter-national
desegregagtion (forced integration).
VII
The current situation in the United States and in Western Europe has
nothing whatsoever to do with “free” immigration. It is forced
integration, plain and simple, and forced integration is the predictable
outcome of democratic – one-man-one-vote – rule. Abolishing forced
integration requires a de-democratization of society, and ultimately the
abolition of democracy. More specifically, the authority to admit or
exclude should be stripped from the hands of the central government and
re-assigned to the states, provinces, cities, towns, villages,
residential districts, and ultimately to private property owners and
their voluntary associations. The means to achieve this goal are
decentralization and secession (both inherently un-democratic, and
un-majoritarian). One would be well on the way toward a restoration of
the freedom of association and exclusion as it is implied in the idea
and institution of private property, and much of the social strife
currently caused by forced integration would disappear, if only towns
and villages could and would do what they did as a matter of course
until well into the nineteenth century in Europe and the United States:
to post signs regarding entrance requirements to the town, and once in
town for entering specific pieces of property (no beggars or bums or
homeless, but also no Moslems, Hindus, Jews, Catholics, etc.); to kick
out those who do not fulfill these requirements as trespassers; and to
solve the “naturalization” question somewhat along the Swiss model,
where local assemblies, not the central government, determine who can
and who cannot become a Swiss citizen.
What should one hope for and advocate as the relatively
correct immigration policy, however, as long as the democratic central
state is still in place and successfully arrogates the power to
determine a uniform national immigration policy? The best one may hope
for, even if it goes against the “nature” of a democracy and thus is not
very likely to happen, is that the democratic rulers act as if they
were the personal owners of the country and as if they had to decide who
to include and who to exclude from their own personal property (into
their very own houses). This means following a policy of utmost
discrimination: of strict discrimination in favor of the human qualities
of skill, character, and cultural compatibility.The current situation
in the United States and in Western Europe has nothing whatsoever to do
with “free” immigration. It is forced integration, plain and simple, and
forced integration is the predictable outcome of democratic –
one-man-one-vote – rule. Abolishing forced integration requires a
de-democratization of society, and ultimately the abolition of
democracy. More specifically, the authority to admit or exclude should
be stripped from the hands of the central government and re-assigned to
the states, provinces, cities, towns, villages, residential districts,
and ultimately to private property owners and their voluntary
associations. The means to achieve this goal are decentralization and
secession (both inherently un-democratic, and un-majoritarian).
More specifically, it means distinguishing strictly
between “citizens” (naturalized immigrants) and “resident aliens” and
excluding the latter from all welfare entitlements. It means requiring
as necessary, for resident alien status as well as for citizenship, the
personal sponsorship by a resident citizen and his assumption of
liability for all property damage caused by the immigrant. It implies
requiring an existing employment contract with a resident citizen;
moreover, for both categories but especially that of citizenship, it
implies that all immigrants must demonstrate through tests not only
(English) language proficiency, but all-around superior (above-average)
intellectual performance and character structure as well as a compatible
system of values – with the predictable result of a systematic
pro-European immigration bias.
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