MULTIMEDIA
Intellectuals and Socialism
by F. A. HAYEK
The Intellectuals and Socialism
By F.A. Hayek
[Reprinted from The University of Chicago Law Review (Spring 1949),
pp. 417-420, 421-423, 425-433; George B. de Huszar ed., The
Intellectuals: A Controversial Portrait (Glencoe, Illinois: the Free
Press, 1960) pp. 371-84.]
In all democratic countries, in the United States even more than
elsewhere, a strong belief prevails that the influence of the
intellectuals on politics is negligible. This is no doubt true of the
power of intellectuals to make their peculiar opinions of the moment
influence decisions, of the extent to which they can sway the popular
vote on questions on which they differ from the current views of the
masses. Yet over somewhat longer periods they have probably never
exercised so great an influence as they do today in those countries.
This power they wield by shaping public opinion.
In the light of recent history it is somewhat curious that this
decisive power of the professional secondhand dealers in ideas should
not yet be more generally recognized. The political development of the
Western World during the last hundred years furnishes the clearest
demonstration. Socialism has never and nowhere been at first a
working-class movement. It is by no means an obvious remedy for the
obvious evil which the interests of that class will necessarily demand.
It is a construction of theorists, deriving from certain tendencies of
abstract thought with which for a long time only the intellectuals were
familiar; and it required long efforts by the intellectuals before the
working classes could be persuaded to adopt it as their program.
In every country that has moved toward socialism, the phase of the
development in which socialism becomes a determining influence on
politics has been preceded for many years by a period during which
socialist ideals governed the thinking of the more active intellectuals.
In Germany this stage had been reached toward the end of the last
century; in England and France, about the time of the first World War.
To the casual observer it would seem as if the United States had reached
this phase after World War II and that the attractio n of a planned and
directed economic system is now as strong among the American
intellectuals as it ever was among their German or English fellows.
Experience suggests that, once this phase has been reached, it is merely
a question of time until the views now held by the intellectuals become
the governing force of politics.
The character of the process by which the views of the intellectuals
influence the politics of tomorrow is therefore of much more than
academic interest. Whether we merely wish to foresee or attempt to
influence the course of events, it is a factor of much greater
importance than is generally understood. What to the contemporary
observer appears as the battle of conflicting interests has indeed often
been decided long before in a clash of ideas confined to narrow
circles. Paradoxically enough, however, in general only the parties of
the Left have done most to spread the belief that it was the numerical
strength of the opposing material interests which decided political
issues, whereas in practice these same parties have regularly and
successfully acted as if they understood the key position of the
intellectuals. Whether by design or driven by the force of
circumstances, they have always directed their main effort toward
gaining the support of this "elite," while the more conservative groups
have acted, as regularly but unsuccessfully, on a more naive view of
mass democracy and have usually vainly tried directly to reach and to
persuade the individual voter.
The term "intellectuals," however, does not at once convey a true
picture of the large class to which we refer, and the fact that we have
no better name by which to describe what we have called the secondhand
dealers in ideas is not the least of the reasons why their power is not
understood. Even persons who use the word "intellectual" mainly as a
term of abuse are still inclined to withhold it from many who
undoubtedly perform that characteristic function. This is neither that
of the original thinker nor that of the scholar or expert in a
particular field of thought. The typical intellectual need be neither:
he need not possess special knowledge of anything in particular, nor
need he even be particularly intelligent, to perform his role as
intermediary in the spreading of ideas. What qualifies him for his job
is the wide range of subjects on which he can readily talk and write,
and a position or habits through which he becomes acquainted with new
ideas sooner than those to whom he addresses himself.
Until one begins to list all the professions and activities which
belong to the class, it is difficult to realize how numerous it is, how
the scope for activities constantly increases in modern society, and how
dependent on it we all have become. The class does not consist of only
journalists, teachers, ministers, lecturers, publicists, radio
commentators, writers of fiction, cartoonists, and artists all of whom
may be masters of the technique of conveying ideas but are usually
amateurs so far as the substance of what they convey is concerned. The
class also includes many professional men and technicians, such as
scientists and doctors, who through their habitual intercourse with the
printed word become carriers of new ideas outside their own fields and
who, because of their expert knowledge of their own subjects, are
listened with respect on most others. There is little that the ordinary
man of today learns about events or ideas except through the medium of
this class; and outside our special fields of work we are in this
respect almost all ordinary men, dependent for our information and
instruction on those who make it their job to keep abreast of opinion.
It is the intellectuals in this sense who decide what views and opinions
are to reach us, which facts are important enough to be told to us, and
in what form and from what angle they are to be presented. Whether we
shall ever learn of the results of the work of the expert and the
original thinker depends mainly on their decision.
The layman, perhaps, is not fully aware to what extent even the popular
reputations of scientists and scholars are made by that class and are
inevitably affected by its views on subjects which have little to do
with the merits of the real achievements. And it is specially
significant for our problem that every scholar can probably name several
instances from his field of men who have undeservedly achieved a
popular reputation as great scientists solely because they hold what the
intellectuals regard as "progressive" political views; but I have yet
to come across a single instance where such a scientific
pseudo-reputation has been bestowed for political reason on a scholar of
more conservative leanings. This creation of reputations by the
intellectuals is particularly important in the fields where the results
of expert studies are not used by other specialists but depend on the
political decision of the public at large. There is indeed scarcely a
better illustration of this than the attitude which professional
economists have taken to the growth of such doctrines as socialism or
protectionism. There was probably at no time a majority of economists,
who were recognized as such by their peers, favorable to socialism (or,
for that matter, to protection). In all probability it is even true to
say that no other similar group of students contains so high a
proportion of its members decidedly opposed to socialism (or
protection). This is the more significant as in recent times it is as
likely as not that it was an early interest in socialist schemes for
reform which led a man to choose economics for his profession. Yet it is
not the predominant views of the experts but the views of a minority,
mostly of rather doubtful standing in their profession, which are taken
up and spread by the intellectuals.
The all-pervasive influence of the intellectuals in contemporary
society is still further strengthened by the growing importance of
"organization." It is a common but probably mistaken belief that the
increase of organization increases the influence of the expert or
specialist. This may be true of the expert administrator and organizer,
if there are such people, but hardly of the expert in any particular
field of knowledge. It is rather the person whose general knowledge is
supposed to qualify him to appreciate expert testimony, and to judge
between the experts from different fields, whose power is enhanced. The
point which is important for us, however, is that the scholar who
becomes a university president, the scientist who takes charge of an
institute or foundation, the scholar who becomes an editor or the active
promoter of an organization serving a particular cause, all rapidly
cease to be scholars or experts and become intellectuals, solely in the
light of certain fashionable general ideas. The number of such
institutions which breed intellectuals and increase their number and
powers grows every day. Almost all the "experts" in the mere technique
of getting knowledge over are, with respect to the subject matter which
they handle, intellectuals and not experts.
In the sense in which we are using the term, the intellectuals are in
fact a fairly new phenomenon of history. Though nobody will regret that
education has ceased to be a privilege of the propertied classes, the
fact that the propertied classes are no longer the best educated and the
fact that the large number of people who owe their position solely to
the their general education do not possess that experience of the
working of the economic system which the administration of property
gives, are important for understanding the role of the intellectual.
Professor Schumpeter, who has devoted an illuminating chapter of his
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy to some aspects of our problem, has
not unfairly stressed that it is the absence of direct responsibility
for practical affairs and the consequent absence of first hand knowledge
of them which distinguishes the typical intellectual from other people
who also wield the power of the spoken and written word. It would lead
too far, however, to examine here further the development of this class
and the curious claim which has recently been advanced by one of its
theorists that it was the only one whose views were not decidedly
influenced by its own economic interests. One of the important points
that would have to be examined in such a discussion would be how far the
growth of this class has been artificially stimulated by the law of
copyright.
It is not surprising that the real scholar or expert and the practical
man of affairs often feel contemptuous about the intellectual, are
disinclined to recognize his power, and are resentful when they discover
it. Individually they find the intellectuals mostly to be people who
understand nothing in particular especially well and whose judgement on
matters they themselves understand shows little sign of special wisdom.
But it would be a fatal mistake to underestimate their power for this
reason. Even though their knowledge may often be superficial and their
intelligence limited, this does not alter the fact that it is their
judgement which mainly determines the views on which society will act in
the not too distant future. It is no exaggeration to say that, once the
more active part of the intellectuals has been converted to a set of
beliefs, the process by which these become generally accepted is almost
automatic and irresistible. These intellectuals are the organs which
modern society has developed for spreading knowledge and ideas, and it
is their convictions and opinions which operate as the sieve through
which all new conceptions must pass before they can reach the masses.
It is of the nature of the intellectual's job that he must use his own
knowledge and convictions in performing his daily task. He occupies his
position because he possesses, or has had to deal from day to day with,
knowledge which his employer in general does not possess, and his
activities can therefore be directed by others only to a limited extent.
And just because the intellectuals are mostly intellectually honest, it
is inevitable that they should follow their own conviction whenever
they have discretion and that they should give a corresponding slant to
everything that passes through their hands. Even where the direction of
policy is in the hands of men of affairs of different views, the
execution of policy will in general be in the hands of intellectuals,
and it is frequently the decision on the detail which determines the net
effect. We find this illustrated in almost all fields of contemporary
society. Newspapers in "capitalist" ownership, universities presided
over by "reactionary" governing bodies, broadcasting systems owned by
conservative governments, have all been known to influence public
opinion in the direction of socialism, because this was the conviction
of the personnel. This has often happened not only in spite of, but
perhaps even because of, the attempts of those at the top to control
opinion and to impose principles of orthodoxy.
The effect of this filtering of ideas through the convictions of a
class which is constitutionally disposed to certain views is by no means
confined to the masses. Outside his special field the expert is
generally no less dependent on this class and scarcely less influenced
by their selection. The result of this is that today in most parts of
the Western World even the most determined opponents of socialism derive
from socialist sources their knowledge on most subjects on which they
have no firsthand information. With many of the more general
preconceptions of socialist thought, the connection of their more
practical proposals is by no means at once obvious; in consequence of
that system of thought become in fact effective spreaders of its ideas.
Who does not know the practical man who in his own field denounces
socialism as "pernicious rot" but, when he steps outside his subject,
spouts socialism like any left journalist? In no other field has the
predominant influence of the socialist intellectuals been felt more
strongly during the last hundred years than in the contacts between
different national civilizations. It would go far beyond the limits of
this article to trace the causes and significance of the highly
important fact that in the modern world the intellectuals provide almost
the only approach to an international community. It is this which
mainly accounts for the extraordinary spectacle that for generations the
supposedly "capitalist" West has been lending its moral and material
support almost exclusively to those ideological movements in countries
father east which aimed at undermining Western civilization and that, at
the same time, the information which the Western public has obtained
about events in Central and Eastern Europe has almost inevitably been
colored by a socialist bias. Many of the "educational" activities of the
American forces of occupation of Germany have furnished clear and
recent examples of this tendency.
A proper understanding of the reasons which tend to incline so many of
the intellectuals toward socialism is thus most important. The first
point here which those who do not share this bias ought to face frankly
is that it is neither selfish interests nor evil intentions but mostly
honest convictions and good intentions which determine the
intellectual's views. In fact, it is necessary to recognize that on the
whole the typical intellectual is today more likely to be a socialist
the more he his guided by good will and intelligence, and that on the
plane of purely intellectual argument he will generally be able to make
out a better case than the majority of his opponents within his class.
If we still think him wrong, we must recognize that it may be genuine
error which leads the well- meaning and intelligent people who occupy
those key positions in our society to spread views which to us appear a
threat to our civilization. 1 Nothing could be more important than to
try to understand the sources of this error in order that we should be
able to counter it. Yet those who are generally regarded as the
representatives of the existing order and who believe that they
comprehend the dangers of socialism are usually very far from such
understanding. They tend to regard the socialist intellectuals as
nothing more than a pernicious bunch of highbrow radicals without
appreciating their influence and, by their whole attitude to them, tend
to drive them even further into opposition to the existing order.
If we are to understand this peculiar bias of a large section of
intellectuals, we must be clear about two points. The first is that they
generally judge all particular issues exclusively in the light of
certain general ideas; the second, that the characteristic errors of any
age are frequently derived from some genuine new truths it has
discovered, and they are erroneous applications of new generalizations
which have proved their value in other fields. The conclusion to which
we shall be led by a full consideration of these facts will be that the
effective refutation of such errors will frequently require further
intellectual advance, and often advance on points which are very
abstract and may seem very remote from the practical issues.
It is perhaps the most characteristic feature of the intellectual that
he judges new ideas not by their specific merits but by the readiness
with which they fit into his general conceptions, into the picture of
the world which he regards as modern or advanced. It is through their
influence on him and on his choice of opinions on particular issues that
the power of ideas for good and evil grows in proportion to their
generality, abstractness, and even vagueness. As he knows little about
the particular issues, his criterion must be consistency with his other
views and suitability for combining into a coherent picture of the
world. Yet this selection from the multitude of new ideas presenting
themselves at every moment creates the characteristic climate of
opinion, the dominant Weltanschauung of a period, which will be
favorable to the reception of some opinions and unfavorable to others
and which will make the intellectual readily accept one conclusion and
reject another without a real understanding of the issues.
In some respects the intellectual is indeed closer to the philosopher
than to any specialist, and the philosopher is in more than one sense a
sort of prince among the intellectuals. Although his influence is
farther removed from practical affairs and correspondingly slower and
more difficult to trace than that of the ordinary intellectual, it is of
the same kind and in the long run even more powerful than that of the
latter. It is the same endeavor toward a synthesis, pursued more
methodically, the same judgement of particular views in so far as they
fit into a general system of thought rather than by their specific
merits, the same striving after a consistent world view, which for both
it was therefore not (as has been suggested by one reviewer of The Road
to Serfdom, Professor J. Schumpeter), "politeness to a fault" but
profound conviction of the importance of this which made me, in
Professor Schumpeter's words, "hardly ever attribute to opponents
anything beyond intellectual error" forms the main basis for accepting
or rejecting ideas. For this reason the philosopher has probably a
greater influence over the intellectuals than any other scholar or
scientist and, more than anyone else, determines the manner in which the
intellectuals exercise their censorship function. The popular influence
of the scientific specialist begins to rival that of the philosopher
only when he ceases to be a specialist and commences to philosophize
about the progress of his subject and usually only after he has been
taken up by the intellectuals for reasons which have little to do with
his scientific eminence.
The "climate of opinion" of any period is thus essentially a set of
very general preconceptions by which the intellectual judges the
importance of new facts and opinions. These preconceptions are mainly
applications to what seem to him the most significant aspects of
scientific achievements, a transfer to other fields of what has
particularly impressed him in the work of the specialists. One could
give a long list of such intellectual fashions and catchwords which in
the course of two or three generations have in turn dominated the
thinking of the intellectuals. Whether it was the "historical approach"
or the theory of evolution, nineteenth century determinism and the
belief in the predominant influence of environment as against heredity,
the theory of relativity or the belief in the power of the unconscious-
every one of these general conceptions has been made the touchstone by
which innovations in different fields have been tested. It seems as if
the less specific or precise (or the less understood) these ideas are,
the wider may be their influence. Sometimes it is no more than a vague
impression rarely put into words which thus wields a profound influence.
Such beliefs as that deliberate control or conscious organization is
also in social affairs always superior to the results of spontaneous
processes which are not directed by a human mind, or that any order
based on a plan laid down beforehand must be better than one formed by
the balancing of opposing forces, have in this way profoundly affected
political development.
Only apparently different is the role of the intellectuals where the
development of more properly social ideas is concerned. Here their
peculiar propensities manifest themselves in making shibboleths of
abstractions, in rationalizing and carrying to extremes certain
ambitions which spring from the normal intercourse of men. Since
democracy is a good thing, the further the democratic principle can be
carried, the better it appears to them. The most powerful of these
general ideas which have shaped political development in recent times is
of course the ideal of material equality. It is, characteristically,
not one of the spontaneously grown moral convictions, first applied in
the relations between particular individuals, but an intellectual
construction originally conceived in the abstract and of doubtful
meaning or application in particular instances. Nevertheless, it has
operated strongly as a principle of selection among the alternative
courses of social policy, exercising a persistent pressure toward an
arrangement of social affairs which nobody clearly conceives. That a
particular measure tends to bring about greater equality has come to be
regarded as so strong a recommendation that little else will be
considered. Since on each particular issue it is this one aspect on
which those who guide opinion have a definite conviction, equality has
determined social change even more strongly than its advocates intended.
Not only moral ideals act in this manner, however. Sometimes the
attitudes of the intellectuals toward the problems of social order may
be the consequence of advances in purely scientific knowledge, and it is
in these instances that their erroneous views on particular issues may
for a time seem to have all the prestige of the latest scientific
achievements behind them. It is not in itself surprising that a genuine
advance of knowledge should in this manner become on occasion a source
of new error. If no false conclusions followed from new generalizations,
they would be final truths which would never need revision. Although as
a rule such a new generalization will merely share the false
consequences which can be drawn from it with the views which were held
before, and thus not lead to new error, it is quite likely that a new
theory, just as its value is shown by the valid new conclusions to which
it leads, will produce other new conclusions to which further advance
will show to have been erroneous. But in such an instance a false belief
will appear with all the prestige of the latest scientific knowledge
supporting it. Although in the particular field to which this belief
applies all the scientific evidence may be against it, it will
nevertheless, before the tribunal of the intellectuals and in the light
of the ideas which govern their thinking, be selected as the view which
is best in accord with the spirit of the time. The specialists who will
thus achieve public fame and wide influence will thus not be those who
have gained recognition by their peers but will often be men whom the
other experts regard as cranks, amateurs, or even frauds, but who in the
eyes of the general public nevertheless become the best known exponents
of their subject.
In particular, there can be little doubt that the manner in which
during the last hundred years man has learned to organize the forces of
nature has contributed a great deal toward the creation of the belief
that a similar control of the forces of society would bring comparable
improvements in human conditions. That, with the application of
engineering techniques, the direction of all forms of human activity
according to a single coherent plan should prove to be as successful in
society as it has been in innumerable engineering tasks, is too
plausible a conclusion not to seduce most of those who are elated by the
achievement of the natural sciences. It must indeed be admitted both
that it would require powerful arguments to counter the strong
presumption in favor of such a conclusion and that these arguments have
not yet been adequately stated. It is not sufficient to point out the
defects of particular proposals based on this kind of reasoning. The
argument will not lose its force until it has been conclusively shown
why what has proved so eminently successful in producing advances in so
many fields should have limits to its usefulness and become positively
harmful if extended beyond these limits. This is a task which has not
yet been satisfactorily performed and which will have to be achieved
before this particular impulse toward socialism can be removed.
This, of course, is only one of many instances where further
intellectual advance is needed if the harmful ideas at present current
are to be refuted and where the course which we shall travel will
ultimately be decided by the discussion of very abstract issues. It is
not enough for the man of affairs to be sure, from his intimate
knowledge of a particular field, that the theories of socialism which
are derived from more general ideas will prove impracticable. He may be
perfectly right, and yet his resistance will be overwhelmed and all the
sorry consequences which he foresees will follow if his is not supported
by an effective refutation of the idees meres. So long as the
intellectual gets the better of the general argument, the most valid
objections of the specific issue will be brushed aside.
This is not the whole story, however. The forces which influence
recruitment to the ranks of the intellectuals operate in the same
direction and help to explain why so many of the most able among them
lean toward socialism. There are of course as many differences of
opinion among intellectuals as among other groups of people; but it
seems to be true that it is on the whole the more active, intelligent,
and original men among the intellectuals who most frequently incline
toward socialism, while its opponents are often of an inferior caliber.
This is true particularly during the early stages of the infiltration of
socialist ideas; later, although outside intellectual circles it may
still be an act of courage to profess socialist convictions, the
pressure of opinion among intellectuals will often be so strongly in
favor of socialism that it requires more strength and independence for a
man to resist it than to join in what his fellows regard as modern
views. Nobody, for instance, who is familiar with large numbers of
university faculties (and from this point of view the majority of
university teachers probably have to be classed as intellectuals rather
than as experts) can remain oblivious to the fact that the most
brilliant and successful teachers are today more likely than not to be
socialists, while those who hold more conservative political views are
as frequently mediocrities. This is of course by itself an important
factor leading the younger generation into the socialist camp.
The socialist will, of course, see in this merely a proof that the more
intelligent person is today bound to become a socialist. But this is
far from being the necessary or even the most likely explanation. The
main reason for this state of affairs is probably that, for the
exceptionally able man who accepts the present order of society, a
multitude of other avenues to influence and power are open, while to the
disaffected and dissatisfied an intellectual career is the most
promising path to both influence and the power to contribute to the
achievement of his ideals. Even more than that: the more conservatively
inclined man of first class ability will in general choose intellectual
work (and the sacrifice in material reward which this choice usually
entails) only if he enjoys it for its own sake. He is in consequence
more likely to become an expert scholar rather than an intellectual in
the specific sense of the word; while to the more radically minded the
intellectual pursuit is more often than not a means rather than an end, a
path to exactly that kind of wide influence which the professional
intellectual exercises. It is therefore probably the fact, not that the
more intelligent people are generally socialists, but that a much higher
proportion of socialists among the best minds devote themselves to
those intellectual pursuits which in modern society give them a decisive
influence on public opinion.
The selection of the personnel of the intellectuals is also closely
connected with the predominant interest which they show in general and
abstract ideas. Speculations about the possible entire reconstruction of
society give the intellectual a fare much more to his taste than the
more practical and short-run considerations of those who aim at a
piecemeal improvement of the existing order. In particular, socialist
thought owes its appeal to the young largely to its visionary character;
the very courage to indulge in Utopian thought is in this respect a
source of strength to the socialists which traditional liberalism sadly
lacks. This difference operates in favor of socialism, not only because
speculation about general principles provides an opportunity for the
play of the imagination of those who are unencumbered by much knowledge
of the facts of present-day life, but also because it satisfies a
legitimate desire for the understanding of the rational basis of any
social order and gives scope for the exercise of that constructive urge
for which liberalism, after it had won its great victories, left few
outlets.
The intellectual, by his whole disposition, is uninterested in
technical details or practical difficulties. What appeal to him are the
broad visions, the spacious comprehension of the social order as a whole
which a planned system promises. This fact that the tastes of the
intellectual were better satisfied by the speculations of the socialists
proved fatal to the influence of the liberal tradition. Once the basic
demands of the liberal programs seemed satisfied, the liberal thinkers
turned to problems of detail and tended to neglect the development of
the general philosophy of liberalism, which in consequence ceased to be a
live issue offering scope for general speculation. Thus for something
over half a century it has been only the socialists who have offered
anything like an explicit program of social development, a picture of
the future society at which they were aiming, and a set of general
principles to guide decisions on particular issues. Even though, if I am
right, their ideals suffer from inherent contradictions, and any
attempt to put them into practice must produce something utterly
different from what they expect, this does not alter the fact that their
program for change is the only one which has actually influenced the
development of social institutions. It is because theirs has become the
only explicit general philosophy of social policy held by a large group,
the only system or theory which raises new problems and opens new
horizons, that they have succeeded in inspiring the imagination of the
intellectuals.
Related to this is another familiar phenomenon: there is little reason
to believe that really first class intellectual ability for original
work is any rarer among Gentiles than among Jews. Yet there can be
little doubt that men of Jewish stock almost everywhere constitute a
disproportionately large number of the intellectuals in our sense, that
is of the ranks of the professional interpreters of ideas. This may be
their special gift and certainly is their main opportunity in countries
where prejudice puts obstacles in their way in other fields. It is
probably more because they constitute so large a proportion of the
intellectuals than for any other reason that they seem to be so much
more receptive of socialist ideas than people of different stocks.
The actual developments of society during this period were determined,
not by a battle of conflicting ideals, but by the contrast between an
existing state of affairs and that one ideal of a possible future
society which the socialists alone held up before the public. Very few
of the other programs which offered themselves provided genuine
alternatives. Most of them were mere compromises or half- way houses
between the more extreme types of socialism and the existing order. All
that was needed to make almost any socialist proposal appear reasonable
to these "judicious" minds who were constitutionally convinced that the
truth must always lie in the middle between the extremes, was for
someone to advocate a sufficiently more extreme proposal. There seemed
to exist only one direction in which we could move, and the only
question seemed to be how fast and how far the movement should proceed.
The significance of the special appeal to the intellectuals which
socialism derives from its speculative character will become clearer if
we further contrast the position of the socialist theorist with that of
his counterpart who is a liberal in the old sense of the word. This
comparison will also lead us to whatever lesson we can draw from an
adequate appreciation of the intellectual forces which are undermining
the foundations of a free society.
Paradoxically enough, one of the main handicaps which deprives the
liberal thinker of popular influence is closely connected with the fact
that, until socialism has actually arrived, he has more opportunity of
directly influencing decisions on current policy and that in consequence
he is not only not tempted into that long-run speculation which is the
strength of the socialists, but is actually discouraged from it because
any effort of this kind is likely to reduce the immediate good he can
do. Whatever power he has to influence practical decisions he owes to
his standing with the representatives of the existing order, and this
standing he would endanger if he devoted himself to the kind of
speculation which would appeal to the intellectuals and which through
them could influence developments over longer periods. In order to carry
weight with the powers that be, he has to be "practical," "sensible,"
and "realistic." So long as he concerns himself with the immediate
issues, he is rewarded with influence, material success, and popularity
with those who up to a point share his general outlook. But these men
have little respect for those speculations on general principles which
shape the intellectual climate. Indeed, if he seriously indulges in such
long-run speculation, he is apt to acquire the reputation of being
"unsound" or even half a socialist, because he is unwilling to identify
the existing order with the free system at which he aims.3
The most glaring recent example of such condemnation of a somewhat
unorthodox liberal work as "socialist" has been provided by some
comments on the late Henry Simons' Economic Policy for a Free Society
(1948). One need not agree with the whole of this work and one may even
regard some of the suggestions made in it as incompatible with a free
society, and yet recognize it as one of the most important contributions
made in recent times to our problem and as just the kind of work which
is required to get discussion started on the fundamental issues. Even
those who violently disagree with some. If, in spite of this, his
efforts continue in the direction of general speculation, he soon
discovers that it is unsafe to associate too closely with those who seem
to share most of his convictions, and he is soon driven into isolation.
Indeed there can be few more thankless tasks at present than the
essential one of developing the philosophical foundation on which the
further development of a free society must be based. Since the man who
undertakes it must accept much of the framework of the existing order,
he will appear to many of the more speculatively minded intellectuals
merely as a timid apologist of things as they are; at the same time he
will be dismissed by the men of affairs as an impractical theorist. He
is not radical enough for those who know only the world where "with ease
together dwell the thoughts" and much too radical for those who see
only how "hard in space together clash the things." If he takes
advantage of such support as he can get from the men of affairs, he will
almost certainly discredit himself with those on whom he depends for
the spreading of his ideas. At the same time he will need most carefully
to avoid anything resembling extravagance or overstatement. While no
socialist theorist has ever been known to discredit himself with his
fellows even by the silliest of proposals, the old- fashioned liberal
will damn himself by an impracticable suggestion. Yet for the
intellectuals he will still not be speculative or adventurous enough,
and the changes and improvements in the social structure he will have to
offer will seem limited in comparison with what their less restrained
imagination conceives.
At least in a society in which the main requisites of freedom have
already been won and further improvements must concern points of
comparative detail, the liberal program can have none of the glamour of a
new invention. The appreciation of the improvements it has to offer
requires more knowledge of the working of the existing society than the
average intellectual possesses. The discussion of these improvements
must proceed on a more practical level than that of the more
revolutionary programs, thus giving a complexion which has little appeal
for the intellectual and tending to bring in elements to whom he feels
directly antagonistic. Those who are most familiar with the working of
the present society are also usually interested in the preservation of
particular features of that society which may not be defensible on
general principles. Unlike the person who looks for an entirely new
future order and who naturally turns for guidance to the theorist, the
men who believe in the existing order also usually think that they
understand it much better than any theorist and in consequence are
likely to reject whatever is unfamiliar and theoretical.
The difficulty of finding genuine and disinterested support for a
systematic policy for freedom is not new. In a passage of which the
reception of a recent book of mine has often reminded me, Lord Acton
long ago described how "at all times sincere friends of freedom have
been rare, and its triumphs have been due to minorities, that have
prevailed by associating themselves with auxiliaries whose objects
differed from their own; and this association, which is always
dangerous, has been sometimes of its suggestions should welcome it as a
contribution which clearly and courageously raises the central problems
of our time. disastrous, by giving to opponents just grounds of
opposition...." More recently, one of the most distinguished living
American economists has complained in a similar vein that the main task
of those who believe in the basic principles of the capitalist system
must frequently be to defend this system against the capitalists--indeed
the great liberal economists, from Adam Smith to the present, have
always known this.
The most serious obstacle which separates the practical men who have
the cause of freedom genuinely at heart from those forces which in the
realm of ideas decide the course of development is their deep distrust
of theoretical speculation and their tendency to orthodoxy; this, more
than anything else, creates an almost impassable barrier between them
and those intellectuals who are devoted to the same cause and whose
assistance is indispensable if the cause is to prevail. Although this
tendency is perhaps natural among men who defend a system because it has
justified itself in practice, and to whom its intellectual
justification seems immaterial, it is fatal to its survival because it
deprives it of the support it most needs. Orthodoxy of any kind, any
pretense that a system of ideas is final and must be unquestioningly
accepted as a whole, is the one view which of necessity antagonizes all
intellectuals, whatever their views on particular issues. Any system
which judges men by the completeness of their conformity to a fixed set
of opinions, by their "soundness" or the extent to which they can be
relied upon to hold approved views on all points, deprives itself of a
support without which no set of ideas can maintain its influence in
modern society. The ability to criticize accepted views, to explore new
vistas and to experience with new conceptions, provides the atmosphere
without which the intellectual cannot breathe. A cause which offers no
scope for these traits can have no support from him and is thereby
doomed in any society which, like ours, rests on his services.
It may be that as a free society as we have known it carries in itself
the forces of its own destruction, that once freedom has been achieved
it is taken for granted and ceases to be valued, and that the free
growth of ideas which is the essence of a free society will bring about
the destruction of the foundations on which it depends. There can be
little doubt that in countries like the United States the ideal of
freedom today has less real appeal for the young than it has in
countries where they have learned what its loss means. On the other
hand, there is every sign that in Germany and elsewhere, to the young
men who have never known a free society, the task of constructing one
can become as exciting and fascinating as any socialist scheme which has
appeared during the last hundred years. It is an extraordinary fact,
though one which many visitors have experienced, that in speaking to
German students about the principles of a liberal society one finds a
more responsive and even enthusiastic audience than one can hope to find
in any of the Western democracies. In Britain also there is already
appearing among the young a new interest in the principles of true
liberalism which certainly did not exist a few years ago.
Does this mean that freedom is valued only when it is lost, that the
world must everywhere go through a dark phase of socialist
totalitarianism before the forces of freedom can gather strength anew?
It may be so, but I hope it need not be. Yet, so long as the people who
over longer periods determine public opinion continue to be attracted by
the ideals of socialism, the trend will continue. If we are to avoid
such a development, we must be able to offer a new liberal program which
appeals to the imagination. We must make the building of a free society
once more an intellectual adventure, a deed of courage. What we lack is
a liberal Utopia, a program which seems neither a mere defense of
things as they are nor a diluted kind of socialism, but a truly liberal
radicalism which does not spare the susceptibilities of the mighty
(including the trade unions), which is not too severely practical, and
which does not confine itself to what appears today as politically
possible. We need intellectual leaders who are willing to work for an
ideal, however small may be the prospects of its early realization. They
must be men who are willing to stick to principles and to fight for
their full realization, however remote. The practical compromises they
must leave to the politicians. Free trade and freedom of opportunity are
ideals which still may arouse the imaginations of large numbers, but a
mere "reasonable freedom of trade" or a mere "relaxation of controls" is
neither intellectually respectable nor likely to inspire any
enthusiasm.The main lesson which the true liberal must learn from the success of the socialists is that it was their courage to be Utopian which gained them the support of the intellectuals and therefore an influence on public opinion which is daily making possible what only recently seemed utterly remote. Those who have concerned themselves exclusively with what seemed practicable in the existing state of opinion have constantly found that even this had rapidly become politically impossible as the result of changes in a public opinion which they have done nothing to guide. Unless we can make the philosophic foundations of a free society once more a living intellectual issue, and its implementation a task which challenges the ingenuity and imagination of our liveliest minds, the prospects of freedom are indeed dark. But if we can regain that belief in the power of ideas which was the mark of liberalism at its best, the battle is not lost. The intellectual revival of liberalism is already underway in many parts of the world. Will it be in time?
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