by Hans-Hermann Hoppe
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by Hans-Hermann Hoppe
One
of the most widely accepted propositions among political economists
is the following: Every monopoly is bad from the viewpoint of
consumers. Monopoly is understood in its classical sense to be an
exclusive privilege granted to a single producer of a commodity or
service, i.e., as the absence of free entry into a particular line
of production. In other words, only one agency, A, may produce a given good, x.
Any such monopolist is bad for consumers because, shielded from
potential new entrants into his area of production, the price of the
monopolist's product x will be higher and the quality of x lower than otherwise.
This
elementary truth has frequently been invoked as an argument in
favor of democratic government as opposed to classical, monarchical
or princely government. This is because under democracy entry into
the governmental apparatus is free — anyone can become prime
minister or president — whereas under monarchy it is restricted to
the king and his heir.
However,
this argument in favor of democracy is fatally flawed. Free
entry is not always good. Free entry and competition in the
production of goods is good, but free competition in the production of bads
is not. Free entry into the business of torturing and killing
innocents, or free competition in counterfeiting or swindling, for
instance, is not good; it is worse than bad. So what sort of
"business" is government? Answer: it is not a customary producer of
goods sold to voluntary consumers. Rather, it is a "business"
engaged in theft and expropriation — by means of taxes and
counterfeiting — and the fencing of stolen goods. Hence, free entry
into government does not improve something good. Indeed, it makes
matters worse than bad, i.e., it improves evil.
Since
man is as man is, in every society people who covet others'
property exist. Some people are more afflicted by this sentiment
than others, but individuals usually learn not to act on such
feelings or even feel ashamed for entertaining them. Generally only a
few individuals are unable to successfully suppress their desire
for others' property, and they are treated as criminals by their
fellow men and repressed by the threat of physical punishment. Under
princely government, only one single person — the prince — can
legally act on the desire for another man's property, and it is this
which makes him a potential danger and a "bad."
However,
a prince is restricted in his redistributive desires because
all members of society have learned to regard the taking and
redistributing of another man's property as shameful and immoral.
Accordingly, they watch a prince's every action with utmost
suspicion. In distinct contrast, by opening entry into government,
anyone is permitted to freely express his desire for others'
property. What formerly was regarded as immoral and accordingly was
suppressed is now considered a legitimate sentiment. Everyone may
openly covet everyone else's property in the name of democracy; and
everyone may act on this desire for another's property, provided
that he finds entrance into government. Hence, under democracy
everyone becomes a threat.
Consequently,
under democratic conditions the popular though immoral and
anti-social desire for another man's property is systematically
strengthened. Every demand is legitimate if it is proclaimed
publicly under the special protection of "freedom of speech."
Everything can be said and claimed, and everything is up for grabs.
Not even the seemingly most secure private property right is exempt
from redistributive demands. Worse, subject to mass elections,
those members of society with little or no inhibitions against
taking another man's property, that is, habitual a-moralists who are
most talented in assembling majorities from a multitude of morally
uninhibited and mutually incompatible popular demands (efficient
demagogues) will tend to gain entrance in and rise to the top of
government. Hence, a bad situation becomes even worse.
Historically,
the selection of a prince was through the accident of his noble
birth, and his only personal qualification was typically his
upbringing as a future prince and preserver of the dynasty, its
status, and its possessions. This did not assure that a prince would
not be bad and dangerous, of course. However, it is worth
remembering that any prince who failed in his primary duty of
preserving the dynasty — who ruined the country, caused civil
unrest, turmoil and strife, or otherwise endangered the position of
the dynasty — faced the immediate risk either of being neutralized
or assassinated by another member of his own family. In any case,
however, even if the accident of birth and his upbringing did not
preclude that a prince might be bad and dangerous, at the same time
the accident of a noble birth and a princely education also did not
preclude that he might be a harmless dilettante or even a good and
moral person.
In
contrast, the selection of government rulers by means of popular
elections makes it nearly impossible that a good or harmless
person could ever rise to the top. Prime ministers and presidents
are selected for their proven efficiency as morally uninhibited
demagogues. Thus, democracy virtually assures that only bad
and dangerous men will ever rise to the top of government. Indeed,
as a result of free political competition and selection, those who
rise will become increasingly bad and dangerous individuals, yet as temporary and interchangeable caretakers they will only rarely be assassinated.
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