Railway Wars in the Himalayas
On October 31st, China’s official Xinhua News Agency announced
that the National Development and Reform Commission had approved a new
rail line running from Lhasa, capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region,
east to Nyingchi.
Toward its eastern end, the line will come close to
India’s state of Arunachal Pradesh. Beijing claims most of Arunachal as
its own, calling it “South Tibet.” Therefore, the Lhasa-Nyingchi
section, part of the Sichuan-Tibet railway, is bound to heighten concern
in New Delhi.
Beijing has been expending substantial sums for more than a decade on transportation infrastructure in the Tibetan homeland. The new 402-kilometer-long line is billed as Tibet’s second railway. The first one, the controversial Qinghai-Tibet railway, went into operation in 2006.
Why is China busy building transportation links to Tibet? First, the Xinhua story implied the Lhasa-Nyingchi line will increase tourism and spur economic development. All this is true, yet there are more important reasons.
For instance, Beijing leaders, insecure about their grip over the Tibetan plateau, have felt a need to bring troops into Tibet quickly and efficiently. The essential problem is that the Chinese have been unwilling to accommodate the people they now rule in Tibet. “We Tibetans say that although the Chinese may have been able to swallow Tibet, they’re not able to digest it,” said Bhuchung Tsering of the International Campaign for Tibet last month, referring to Mao Zedong’s invasion of Tibet in 1950 and its subsequent annexation.
Beijing, therefore, has been forced to commit substantial forces to control Tibet’s vast spaces. “The Lhasa to Nyingchi railway section is conducive to improving the regional road network and transportation capacity to better integrate Tibet with other parts of China,” said Yang Yulin, a Tibet railway official, to Xinhua, speaking most diplomatically.
Most important from Beijing’s perspective is that troops ferried to Tibet to suppress dissent and revolts can also be used to harass Indian forces in areas that both China and India claim. The two countries maintain two significant competing territorial claims, one in the Ladakh region of the state of Jammu and Kashmir in the west and Arunachal Pradesh in the east, and these disputes bring two large armies into close proximity high in the Himalayas.
Chinese incursions south of the Line of Actual Control, the temporary and ill-defined border between India and China along their western boundary, appear to be on the rise, not only in number but also in scope. In April 2013, for instance, a platoon-size force camped far south of the line in Ladakh, and this September about a thousand troops moved south, also in that district.
China sees its recent moves to add to the rail infrastructure as balancing India’s, but India is playing catchup in the Himalayas, “a wide asymmetry in infrastructure” as India Today put it. “Our projects were in hibernation in the last 15 years,” said Minister of State for External Affairs V. K. Singh, a retired general. New Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has promised to accelerate overdue infrastructure building. At the same time, he is thinking both short-term—reinforcing Indian forces in disputed areas—and far into the future—planning civilian settlements there.
New Delhi is far behind China’s efforts to build roads and railroads near disputed territory. Modi, supported by a reviving economy, may be able to make up some ground in building transport links. Yet one thing is certain: two giants are competing with each other to build the logistical infrastructure that will be used to supply two large armies high in the Himalayas.
Beijing has been expending substantial sums for more than a decade on transportation infrastructure in the Tibetan homeland. The new 402-kilometer-long line is billed as Tibet’s second railway. The first one, the controversial Qinghai-Tibet railway, went into operation in 2006.
Why is China busy building transportation links to Tibet? First, the Xinhua story implied the Lhasa-Nyingchi line will increase tourism and spur economic development. All this is true, yet there are more important reasons.
For instance, Beijing leaders, insecure about their grip over the Tibetan plateau, have felt a need to bring troops into Tibet quickly and efficiently. The essential problem is that the Chinese have been unwilling to accommodate the people they now rule in Tibet. “We Tibetans say that although the Chinese may have been able to swallow Tibet, they’re not able to digest it,” said Bhuchung Tsering of the International Campaign for Tibet last month, referring to Mao Zedong’s invasion of Tibet in 1950 and its subsequent annexation.
Beijing, therefore, has been forced to commit substantial forces to control Tibet’s vast spaces. “The Lhasa to Nyingchi railway section is conducive to improving the regional road network and transportation capacity to better integrate Tibet with other parts of China,” said Yang Yulin, a Tibet railway official, to Xinhua, speaking most diplomatically.
Most important from Beijing’s perspective is that troops ferried to Tibet to suppress dissent and revolts can also be used to harass Indian forces in areas that both China and India claim. The two countries maintain two significant competing territorial claims, one in the Ladakh region of the state of Jammu and Kashmir in the west and Arunachal Pradesh in the east, and these disputes bring two large armies into close proximity high in the Himalayas.
Chinese incursions south of the Line of Actual Control, the temporary and ill-defined border between India and China along their western boundary, appear to be on the rise, not only in number but also in scope. In April 2013, for instance, a platoon-size force camped far south of the line in Ladakh, and this September about a thousand troops moved south, also in that district.
China sees its recent moves to add to the rail infrastructure as balancing India’s, but India is playing catchup in the Himalayas, “a wide asymmetry in infrastructure” as India Today put it. “Our projects were in hibernation in the last 15 years,” said Minister of State for External Affairs V. K. Singh, a retired general. New Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has promised to accelerate overdue infrastructure building. At the same time, he is thinking both short-term—reinforcing Indian forces in disputed areas—and far into the future—planning civilian settlements there.
New Delhi is far behind China’s efforts to build roads and railroads near disputed territory. Modi, supported by a reviving economy, may be able to make up some ground in building transport links. Yet one thing is certain: two giants are competing with each other to build the logistical infrastructure that will be used to supply two large armies high in the Himalayas.
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